Water as Property by Zellmer, Sandi
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications from The Water Center Water Center, The 
November 2006 
Water as Property 
Sandi Zellmer 
University of Nebraska Lincoln, szellmer2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/watercenterpubs 
 Part of the Water Resource Management Commons 
Zellmer, Sandi, "Water as Property" (2006). Faculty Publications from The Water Center. 2. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/watercenterpubs/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Water Center, The at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications from The Water Center by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Water as Property 
Sandra B. Zellmer, Professor UNL College of Law and Jessica Harder, J.D., Water 
Outreach Associate UNL Water Center   
 
I.  Introduction  
The issue of whether water is or should be characterized as property under the law raises 
considerable controversy.  In the western United States, water is typically viewed as a form of 
property, while in the east it is not.  Whether water should be treated as property has been the subject 
of an extensive body of scholarship.  Proponents argue that establishing legally protected, secure 
private property rights encourages maximum utilization of resources.1  Also, exclusivity and surety of 
possession can foster wise investment of labor and stewardship.  Conversely, the absence of legally 
protected interests in property ownership can result in a “tragedy of the commons,” where a public 
resource is plundered as each selfish (yet economically rational) actor takes steps to promote self-
interest with little regard for externalities that deplete or even destroy the resource.2  
 
Opponents assert that water is an essential resource that should not be treated as a 
commodity.  They advocate public ownership and regulation of water resources, arguing that water is 
unique and therefore should not be subject to profit-motivated management like other natural 
resources, such as land or minerals, and personal items, such as teacups or jewelry.  Their arguments 
are bolstered with evidence that jurisdictions that recognize private property rights in water, as in the 
western United States, have not necessarily encouraged conservation but rather have created 
incentives to overuse the resource.3  
 
This memorandum analyzes whether water is treated as property under current American 
legal systems, with an emphasis on Nebraska law.  It also considers the implications of treating water 
as property.  The analysis focuses on surface water, but the utilization of groundwater resources raises 
many of the same issues and concerns.4  
 
II.  Water is a Unique Public Trust Resource 
In systems built on English common law, surface water is viewed as a type of “public trust” 
resource, where the sovereign retains rights and responsibilities to protect the resource for the public. 
The public trust doctrine, which traces its pedigree to Roman law, recognizes that water is an 
essential resource upon which entire societies depend for survival.5  As such, tidal and navigable 
waterways, shorelines and stream beds “should not be held exclusively in private hands, but should be 
open to the public or at least subject to what Roman law called the ‘jus publicum’: the ‘public 
right.’”6  Although the doctrine was adopted in the United States through the incorporation of English 
common law, there is “an astonishingly universal regard for communal values in water worldwide.”7  
A review of Asian, African, Islamic, Latin American, and Native American laws indicates that the 
headwaters of the public trust doctrine “arise in rivulets from all reaches of the basin that holds the 
societies of the world."8
 
The public trust doctrine has enjoyed modern staying power through the work of legal 
scholars and judicial opinions at both the federal and state level.9  Courts have referenced the doctrine 
in granting public access for navigation and fishing,10 and, in some cases, in recognizing the right of 
the public to preserve its waters to support fish and wildlife species.11   
 
According to Professor Joseph Sax, who has written frequently on the nature of property 
rights, the uniqueness of water is universally recognized:
The roots of private property have never been deep enough to vest in water users a 
compensable right to diminish lakes and rivers or to destroy the marine life within 
them. Water is not like a pocket watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner may 
destroy with impunity. The rights of use in water, however long standing, should 
never be confused with more personal, more fully owned, property. Far from being 
a sudden and unpredictable change in the definition of property, recognition of the 
right of the state to protect its water resources is only a restatement of a familiar 
and oft-stated public prerogative.12
 
Thus, in theory, water should be looked upon as something no one can own exclusively, as the 
interests of the public and the state, acting in the public interest, create an additional layer to consider 
in resolving conflicts over the use and allocation of water.13
 
In the eastern United States, the public trust doctrine underlies the law of “reasonable use,” 
where riparian land owners have usufructuary rights to water that flows through or past their land but 
are liable for monetary damages or injunctive relief if they deplete the natural flow in a way that 
harms downstream users.14  In the west, the public trust doctrine is frequently cited by state courts, 
but it has rarely been utilized as a significant curb on private rights in water by imposing limitations 
on wasteful or otherwise harmful uses.  In a path-breaking opinion, the Supreme Court of California 
indicated a willingness to impose the doctrine on appropriators in National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court (the Mono Lake case), when it stated that:  
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable 
waters and the lands beneath those waters. This principle, fundamental to the concept 
of the public trust, applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands 
and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate 
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.15
 
As a result, in California, the state water board must consider the public trust in making decisions on 
the application for, or transfer of, water rights.16  In spite of the court’s bold language, however, the 
Mono Lake decision has had relatively little impact on the use and exploitation of water resources in 
the west under the prior appropriation doctrine, described below.  The case is frequently cited, but 
other states have not fully embraced it as precedent.17  
 
III.  Property Rights in Water Can Exacerbate Waste 
  In a marked deviation from the English common law of riparianism, the western United 
States embraced a doctrine known as prior appropriation.  Although water is still viewed as a unique 
type of public resource, private property rights to use water are legally protected in state constitutions, 
statutes and caselaw.  For example, the Colorado constitution states that “the right to divert the 
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.”18  Yet another 
provision of that state’s constitution provides that water is “the property of the state, and the same is 
dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation. . . .”19  Nebraska’s 
constitution is somewhat similar, with an important distinction:  “The right to divert unappropriated 
waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is 
demanded by the public interest.”20   
 
 Prior appropriation arose during the late 1800s as a way to maximize the use of a scarce 
resource in the arid west and to promote settlement and economic development.21  Common wisdom 
has it that western courts simply followed the customs of the mining camps in the use and allocation 
of water, but the underlying objectives were almost certainly more complex.  The Colorado Supreme 
Court recently observed that “[t]he roots of Colorado water law reside in the agrarian, populist efforts 
of miners and farmers to resist speculative investment that would corner the water resource to the 
exclusion of actual users settling into the territory. . . . Colorado's provisions reflect the anti-
monopolistic undergirding of this state's water law.”22   
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The prior appropriation regime, often described as “first in time, first in right,” served as a 
simple way to determine who got water, how much he or she got, and when.  The measure of a right 
to use water is quantified by how much the actor diverts for “beneficial use.”23  Beneficial use 
includes domestic, agricultural and industrial activities.  Although wasteful uses are not beneficial, 
definitions of “waste” are generally quite lenient and laws prohibiting waste are rarely enforced.24
 
Over-appropriation has become an almost insurmountable problem in many watersheds of the 
west.25  “Far from being efficient in free-market economic terms, prior appropriation is highly 
wasteful.” 26  Meanwhile, far from accomplishing conservation, by encouraging individuals to use 
water for maximum beneficial uses, prior appropriation has promoted rapid depletion of the resource 
and, in some cases, the collapse of riparian communities.  The requirement that water be diverted and 
put to conventional beneficial uses tends to ignore ecological priorities, such as instream values like 
fisheries and recreation, by perpetuating the idea that any water left in the stream is effectively 
wasted.27 Additional facets of prior appropriation, including abandonment and forfeiture, force water 
right holders into a “use it or lose it” mindset.28  These elements of the prior appropriation system 
penalize water rights holders for conservation or innovation and motivate water right holders to horde 
and use as much water as possible.29  Prior appropriation in its pure form, then, leaves little room for 
conservation or recognition of other collective societal values, such as instream flows, ecosystem 
management or recreation, and does little to encourage sustainable water management.30    
 
Perhaps signaling an emerging trend in water law, in its 2005 opinion in Spear T. Ranch v. 
Knaub, the Nebraska Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that “[a] right to appropriate surface 
water . . . is not an ownership of property.  Instead, the water is viewed as a public want and the 
appropriation is a right to use the water.”31  Likewise, Nebraska’s groundwater resources are publicly 
owned and are not subject to private ownership:  “The protected right of landowners is the right to the 
use of the ground water, and does not reach the ownership of the water itself.”32  The legislative and 
executive branches of the state have taken steps to promote sustainable management of its surface and 
groundwater resources through the enactment and implementation of LB 962 (2004) and other 
measures, some of which might not have been possible if Nebraska viewed water rights as inviolate 
property rights.33
 
IV.  Proposals for Reform: Markets and Other Notions 
In order to rectify the shortcomings of prior appropriation, advocates for reform have called 
for greater flexibility in legal doctrines governing the use and conservation of water, rather than rigid 
individual property rights.34  Regardless of the nature of any given reform proposal, a change in the 
status quo will meet vehement resistance from water users. 
 
A few of the more radical proposals call for dismantling the prior appropriation doctrine 
altogether.35  If water is treated as property under state law, however, such a reform would raise the 
specter of a government “taking”, which would likely require compensation under the U.S. 
Constitution.36  Short of outright dismemberment, imposing greater restrictions on water use through 
governmental regulation to protect imperiled species or water quality can be effective in promoting 
conservation, but appropriators may respond with “takings” claims in this instance as well.  In Tulare 
Lake v. U.S., the federal claims court awarded irrigators some $20 million when the Bureau of 
Reclamation curtailed contract allowances to provide flow for endangered species.37  Arguably, the 
Tulare court erred in failing to address the public trust as an inherent limitation on title, the exercise 
of which would not be a taking.38  The public trust theory as a defense to a taking claim may be sound 
but it is virtually untested, and legislators and agencies have been fearful of pushing its limits.39   
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Short of dismantling prior appropriation altogether, a less drastic reform option may be to 
redefine the concept of “beneficial use” to promote conservation and inhibit excessive use and to 
better reflect emerging societal values.40  For example, by statute, many western states, including 
Nebraska, now recognize instream uses like fisheries as beneficial.41
 
A more politically palatable option may be to work within the current system by using water 
markets as a method to reallocate water rights from low-value consumptive uses to high value but less 
traditional uses, such as instream flows for recreation and fisheries.42  Some states have experimented 
with allowing owners to “retire” their water rights temporarily (e.g., during spawning season) without 
fear of losing them through abandonment or forfeiture.43  Certainty and the protection of reasonable 
expectations are both necessary for market transactions to take place.44  In most jurisdictions, 
however, a proposal to transfer a water right triggers an intensive investigation into the owners’ past 
practices, sometimes resulting in forfeiture and loss of all or some of the right.45  Moreover, even the 
most senior appropriator will be prevented from transferring her water right if other appropriators will 
be harmed as a result of the transfer.46  Due to these factors and others that result in high transaction 
costs, water markets are not yet terribly active in the American west.  To the extent that transfers do 
occur, they typically involve small-scale transactions between users with similar uses at similar 
locations rather than exports or changes to more socially desirable or efficient uses.47  In Nebraska, 
changes in use are discouraged by a statutory provision that forbids permanent changes between 
ories for domestic uses, agriculture, or industrial purposes.48preference categ  
As a matter of policy, restrictions on water rights and, consequently, water markets are not 
necessarily unreasonable as they promote equity, distributive justice and conservation.  Because of 
the uniqueness of water and because of potential third-party effects, Joseph Sax concludes that water 
markets simply “cannot be expected to resemble more conventional markets.”49
 
On the other hand, the riparian “reasonable use” tort-like rules of the eastern United States, 
with their reliance on judicial enforcement and after-the-fact liability, are no panacea, either.  As a 
result, some eastern states have adopted reforms, via regulations and permit systems, to incorporate 
some facets of prior appropriation to promote investment and enhance certainty.  One common 
modification is to allow water to be used away from the riparian tract, so that riparian landowners no 
longer enjoy a monopoly on water.  Florida and other eastern states that have adopted some form of 
“regulated riparianism” delegate broad authority to administrative agencies to oversee the system and 
ensure that the public trust is protected.50
 
V.  Conclusion 
When it comes to water, strong property rights do not necessarily solve the tragedy of the 
commons by preventing misuse.  Instead, it appears that, absent substantial government intervention, 
private property systems do not fully protect this vital, shared resource.  Instead, a system of regulated 
rights, with permits and other enforceable mechanisms, along with market-based incentives and 
disincentives, such as water banks and fees, will likely prove more useful in managing water 
resources in a sustainable fashion over the long-term. 
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